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Abstract
A longstanding theoretical discussion on the merits of prices vs.
quantities for regulating emissions under uncertainty exists in envi-
ronmental policy literature. However, empirical evidence w.r.t. in-
strument choice has not been put forward so far. In particular, very
little is known about instrument preferences from the perspective of
firms. Investigating Swiss climate policy provides an ideal field for en-
countering both of the above concerns. In Switzerland, firms can self-
select between a tax (with a wage-based tax exemption) and emissions
trading (with a grandfathering mode of permit allocation) to regulate
their CO2 emissions. In our paper, we empirically investigate this self-
selection mechanism based on a cross section of Swiss firm-level data.
Specific theory on Swiss policy design identifies the influential factors
as being permit allocation, wages, uncertainty in abatement costs and
the flexibility of firms’ abatement technologies. We confirm evidence
for the first two factors, but were unable to find evidence for the latter
ones. Moreover, high-abatement firms tend to choose permit trading.
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1 Introduction
It is widely accepted by environmental economists that market-based instru-
ments are the preferred policy to reduce harmful emissions. In turn, if firms
face uncertainty in the costs of abating these emissions, the choice between a
price or a quantity instrument matters. There is extensive theoretical liter-
ature on the relative merits of the instruments in this context (i.e. a tax vs.
permit trading vs. a hybrid instrument vs. the simultaneous use of tax and
permit trading). If, in addition, asymmetric information is assumed between
the regulatory authority and the firms, theory suggests a “Policy à la Carte”,
i.e. a self-selection mechanism with the instrument choice being delegated to
firms (Krysiak and Oberauner, 2010).
However, empirical research on instrument choice on these issues is still a
largely unexplored domain. In our paper, we alleviate the lack of evidence by
empirically investigating the instrument preferences of firms when the regula-
tory authority allows them to choose between a tax and permit trading. We
have chosen the self-selection mechanism that is implemented in Switzerland
as providing optimal data for our empirical research on instrument choice.
Single instrument regimes are extensively investigated in environmental
economic literature to regulate firms’ emissions. Market-based instruments
– such as a tax and permit trading – are widely accepted in economics as
the preferred instruments to achieve a cost-effective outcome. While a tax
and permit trading both perform equally under complete information, the
choice between a price and a quantity instrument become critical if there is
uncertainty with regard to firms’ abatement costs (Baumol and Oates, 1988;
Weitzman, 1974). The preferability of a tax or permit trading in a single
instrument regime when uncertainty makes a first-best outcome impossible
is investigated by Williams III (2002). Numerous variations of market-based
policy designs have been developed so far (e.g. hybrid regulation proposed
by Roberts and Spence (1976)). Except for Mandell (2008) and Krysiak and
Oberauner (2010), all theses approaches share one thing in common: Ex-post
(i.e. once the uncertainty has been resolved), they all end up with either a
tax or permit trading to regulate all firms.
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Mandell (2008) pioneers a new frontier with respect to policy choice. He
was the first to attempt a policy design in which the market is separated into
parts that are regulated by different instruments simultaneously. He proposes
to regulate one part of the market by a tax and the other by permit trading,
which results in a reduction of the welfare loss incurred by uncertainty under
a single instrument regime. In the approach of Mandell (2008), instrument
assignment takes place ex-ante with abatement costs of firms being common
knowledge. Hence, a socially optimal assignment of firms to instruments is
ensured.
Taken a step further, Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) additionally allow
for abatement costs being firms’ private knowledge. The regulatory authority
offers firms the choice of instrument, i.e. between a tax and permit trading,
and firms then choose the one with the lowest expected costs. They show
that by offering the firms a “policy menu”, the same results can be achieved
as with Mandell (2008), yet under more restrictive assumptions.
A variant of the approach presented by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010)
is implemented in Switzerland. The Swiss confederation offers firms a pol-
icy menu to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from which firms can
choose their preferred instrument. The policy menu consists of a tax (charged
on every ton of CO2) and of permit trading (with free-of-charge permit allo-
cation). The revenue of tax payments is refunded to taxpaying firms based
on their gross wages.
This unique policy implementation offers a challenging spectrum of em-
pirical research associated with the prices versus quantities debate and the
performance of different instruments subject to equal economic conditions.
Moreover, it offers valuable information on the incentives that this policy
menu offers firms when choosing between the tax and permit trading. The
main focus of our paper concerns the latter field of research. We empirically
investigate firms’ instrument preferences and test the theoretical model pro-
vided by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) on Swiss firm data. Our findings
provide valuable insights that can be applied to future environmental policy
design and implementation.
Empirical instrument choice is evaluated in a cross-section analysis based
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on firm-level data from the manufacturing industries in Switzerland. Data
stem from a survey that was conducted in the course of a research project for
the WWZ Forum, University of Basel, to reveal the effects of climate policy
in Switzerland at firm level.
Our theoretical model on Swiss climate policy suggests instrument choice
in favor of emissions trading whenever the expected value of permit allocation
net of trade-specific fixed costs outweighs the expected benefits unter the tax
(i.e. the expected tax refund plus a flexibility-uncertainty advantage under a
tax net of tax-specific fixed costs). Our results gained from a logit regression
on instrument choice confirm the evidence regarding permit allocation and
the tax refund. We were unable, however, to find evidence that under un-
certainty more flexible firms prefer the tax. Moreover, high-abatement firms
tend to choose emissions trading.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review
the existing literature on the choice of prices versus quantities in environ-
mental regulation. In Section 3, Swiss climate policy is introduced. The
theoretical model is presented in Section 4. Data and variables for our em-
pirical analysis are sketched in Section 5. In Section 6, the empirical model
specifications and results are discussed. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Literature
The main theoretical foundation for our analysis originates from the prices
versus quantities discussion in the environmental policy literature initiated
by Weitzman (1974), advanced among others, for example, by Roberts and
Spence (1976), Mandell (2008), and Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), and
reviewed by Hepburn (2006).
Weitzman (1974) has shown, that from a social perspective, firms should
be regulated by a tax whenever the slope of the marginal abatement cost
function outweighs the slope of the marginal damage function in absolute
terms, and uncertainty renders a first-best outcome impossible. A quantity
instrument is preferable when the opposite is true.
The choice of instrument to be implemented has gained particular at-
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tention in the context of climate change mitigation. Contributors to the
discussion on instrument choice for countering greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions and stock pollutants in general are – among others – Hoel and Karp
(2002), Pizer (2002) and Newell and Pizer (2003). Due to the uncertainties
inherent in the regulation of GHG emissions, the authors emphasize the rel-
ative merits of a tax. First and foremost and in line with Weitzman (1974),
they argue that flat marginal damages of GHGs make the tax superior in
efficiency terms to emissions trading. In contrast, by adding enforceabil-
ity considerations to the analysis under uncertainty, Rohling and Ohndorf
(2010) argue in support of a quantity instrument in the context of climate-
related policies. Enforcement concerns, however, are only an issue in the
international context of national sovereignty.
Roberts and Spence (1976) were the first to introduce the concept of a
mixed or hybrid instrument. They propose a scheme of tradeable permits
with a price ceiling and a price floor for permits (i.e. a tax and a subsidy)
with an ex-post choice of instrument depending on how the uncertainty is
resolved. Their approach results in a single instrument regime with all firms
regulated by one of the three instrument. Pizer (2002) admits a hybrid system
with a “safety valve” to be a good alternative to the tax in the regulation of
greenhouse gases.
In contrast to Roberts and Spence (1976), Mandell (2008) presents a
mixed regulation with the simultaneous use of different instruments. In his
approach, the market is separated into a tax-regulated part and a part that
is regulated by permit trading. Compared to a single tax or single permit
trading, an emissions level can be achieved that comes closer to the efficient
level, thereby reducing the welfare loss due to uncertainty. Mandell (2008)
shows, that it can be optimal to use only a tax, but it is never optimal to
only use permit trading. To optimally assign the firms to the instruments,
the regulatory authority needs information on the technology used by firms
to abate emissions, i.e. on the cost structure of abating emissions.
Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) take this approach a step further and allow
for asymmetric information between the regulatory authority and firms with
regard to their implemented technology. By offering firms the choice between
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a tax and permit trading – accompanied by a tax exemption and/or partly
auctioned permits – they show that firms self-select the instrument that is
optimal from a social point of view. In their approach, the regulator has to
set a tax as if it were the only instrument to be implemented and to allocate
as many permits as necessary for the expected price for permits to equal the
tax.
To our knowledge – besides Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) – only one
paper exists that explores firms’ choice of instrument to regulate pollution
emissions. Delmas and Marcus (2004) discuss the firms’ preferences between
a command-and-control (CAC) instrument and negotiated agreements based
on the transaction costs incurred by those instruments. However, the authors
derive neither cost-minimizing analytical nor empirical criteria for instrument
choice. Moreover, their focus is on transaction costs, but not on the costs
that accrue from abatement and regulation, which are, however, the main
drivers in firms’ decision behavior.
An approach similar to Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) is implemented in
Switzerland to regulate firms’ carbon dioxide emissions. For our empirical
analysis on which instrument firms prefer – based on Swiss firm-level data –
we first introduce Swiss climate policy.
3 Swiss Climate Policy Design
By January 2008, active measures to combat climate change were imple-
mented in Switzerland. Private individuals and firms were obliged to pay a
carbon dioxide tax (CO2 tax) on the combustion of fossil fuels. This means,
private individuals are charged a tax whenever they purchase fossil fuels for
heating or cooling. Firms are charged the tax whenever they use fossil energy
resources in their production processes to generate heat, cooling or electric-
ity.1
If the firms’ share of fossil fuels were large compared to total inputs and
if firms’ competitiveness might be violated by the tax, firms were offered the
1Carbon dioxide emissions from transport are regulated separately.
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possibility of being exempted from the tax (Swiss Federal Assembly, 1999).
This option is predicated on their committing to a legally-binding reduction
in their carbon dioxide emissions at a predetermined level. While large firms
are allocated free permits that correspond to their reduction target and are
free to trade their allowances (buy and sell), small- and medium-sized firms
are only allowed to buy permits in order to cover emissions in excess of their
quantity target.2
According to this policy design, firms explicitly have the choice to be
either regulated by a price (the CO2 tax) or else by a quantity instrument
(permit trading, CAC with permit purchase option). Large firms are free
to choose between the tax and permit trading. For the time being, we pass
over the discrimination of small- and medium-sized firms in their lack of
choice between the tax and permit trading. We will examine this aspect
more thoroughly at a later stage in our analysis.
Specific design elements for both instruments are legally documented in
the CO2 Act, passed by the Swiss parliament in 1999 (Swiss Federal Assem-
bly, 1999). Firms that opted for the tax paid 12 Swiss francs on every ton
of carbon dioxide emitted in 2008. The tax rate follows a phasing-in process
that is conditional on annual national reduction achievements.3 Tax revenues
are refunded to taxpaying firms based on their gross wages. According to the
Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (2010c), the tax refund rate in 2008
is approximately 37 Swiss francs per 100,000 Swiss francs gross wages.
Permit trading is operated in a cap-and-trade style. Those firms that
chose to be regulated via permit trading are required to hold an account at
2The Energy Agency for the Economy (EnAW) serves as an intermediator between the
Swiss confederation and firms. It provides three quantitative commitment models to firms.
Large energy-intensive firms are intended to join the Energy Model in conjunction with
permit trading participation. For small- and medium-sized firms, alternative measures
were designated. These firms either commit to a specific value target (Benchmark Model)
or else to a plan of actions (model for small- and medium-sized firms – SME Model).
Firms in the Benchmark or SME Model do not receive free permits, but are permitted to
buy emission allowances on the permit market to cover emissions when they fail to meet
their specific targets. Thus, Swiss climate policy design discriminates against small- and
medium-sized tax-exempted, low-abatement-cost firms by prohibiting them from selling
their excess emissions on the market.
3 While the tax rate was not increased in 2009, it was raised to 36 Swiss francs in 2010,
as the national emission reduction target was not met in 2008.
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the National Emissions Trading Registry. By June 2010, a total of 405 instal-
lations of all industries held an account at the registry (Swiss Federal Office
for the Environment, 2010b). The permit allocation method used is grand-
fathering, i.e. free-of-charge permit allocation based on historic emissions,
with the emission allowances referred to as Swiss Units (CHUs).4
Taken together, climate policy implementation events in Switzerland oc-
cur in the following order. First, the Swiss confederation specifies a certain
tax rate (12 Swiss francs in 2008) for tax paying firms and sets an overall cap
for carbon emissions (aggregated individual reduction targets) for emissions
trading firms. Moreover, it announces to refund tax receipts and to allo-
cate permits free of charge. Second, after policy announcement, firms can
choose between the two instruments. They will compare the expected costs
under both instruments and choose the one for which these costs are lower.
Finally, according to the incentives provided under the chosen instrument,
firms decide on their carbon dioxide emissions abatement level.
Section 4 analyzes this policy design from a theoretical point of view.
4 Theoretical Model
The theoretical model of firms’ instrument choice between a tax and permit
trading to be tested for Swiss firm data is adopted from Krysiak and Ober-
auner (2010) and has been adjusted for our present purposes. A continuum
of firms with mass one emits a homogeneous and uniformly mixed pollutant.
To reduce environmental damage from emissions, the regulator offers firms
a policy menu that consists of a tax and permit trading, from which firms
choose their preferred instrument (self-selection mechanism). There is un-
certainty concerning emissions abatement costs that only resolves when the
abatement decision has to be made. Besides, the technology used to abate
4According to the CO2 Act (Swiss Federal Assembly, 1999), the determination of firms’
individual reduction targets is based on their historic abatement measures, the costs of
abatement measures, their international competitive position, and their expected output
growth. The correlation coefficients between historic emissions (2006 and 2007) and permit
allocation in 2008 amount to 0.9919 and 0.9915, respectively. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume a pure grandfathering mode of permit allocation.
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emissions differs among firms and is private knowledge. The self-selection
mechanism ensures that the resulting asymmetric information problem be-
tween the regulator and the firms will be overcome. Krysiak and Oberauner
(2010) further allow for two additional “fine-tuning” variables (tax exemption
modeled as a lump sum and partly auctioned permits) to ensure a socially
optimal self-allocation of firms to instruments.
This approach is adjusted to two specific Swiss climate policy design el-
ements. First, the tax exemption is modeled as a refund of tax revenues for
taxpaying firms based on their wages. Second, the allocation of permits is
solely based on historic emissions (grandfathering) that coincide with emis-
sions in the absence of any regulation. In addition, we allow for instrument-
specific fixed costs that are supposed to differ substantially between the tax
and permit trading.5
The decision criterion for the choice of instrument is the difference in
the expected costs of abatement of the instruments, or differently formulated
making it conditional on emissions, the difference in expected savings from
emitting the pollutant.
If a firm chooses to pay the tax t, it will maximize its savings6 from
emitting emissions e
max
e≥0
St(e) = (α + θ)e− e
2
2β
− te+ τw − Ft, (1)
where θ denotes uncertainty, τ the refund rate of tax revenues, w the firm’s
gross wages, and Ft the fixed costs incurred with the tax.7 Furthermore, the
firm’s technology is expressed by the parameters α ≥ 0 and β > 0.
Eq. 1 characterizes the firm’s savings from emitting a pollutant, minus
the tax payment, plus the refund share of tax revenues that is conditional on
the firm’s wages, and minus the tax-specific fixed costs.
5 We expect the fixed costs to be low or even zero for the tax, but substantial for
permit trading. Costs for trading firms comprise the efforts to get exempted from the tax,
the EnAW membership fee, consulting costs, monitoring, reporting and verification, etc.
(Oberauner and Krysiak, 2010).
6Firm’s marginal savings from emitting correspond inversely to firm’s marginal abate-
ment costs.
7Subscript t indicates the tax.
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Uncertainty is characterized by the parameter θ that is firm-specific, but
correlated among firms with ρ ∈ (0, 1]. θ has an expected value of zero and
a positive variance of σ2.
Firms are heterogeneous in two dimensions: they differ in their savings
parameter β and in their wages w.8 Let the joint density of β and w be
f(w, β). From Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), we know that firms with a
high β choose the tax, whereas firms with a low β choose permit trading. The
intuition for this sorting under the self-selection mechanism is the following.
Firms under a tax are more flexible in adjusting their emissions to random
influences than firms under emissions trading due to the correlation between
firms’ savings and the permit price. Consequently, a more flexible firm (high
β) is better off by choosing the tax in expected saving terms. There is a single
firm that is indifferent in the choice of instrument due to expected savings
equality. The indifferent firm is tagged by the technology parameter βcrit(w)
which is, in turn, conditional on wages. Hence, all firms with a combina-
tion of (w, β) such that β ∈ [0, βcrit(w)) will participate in permit trading.
Otherwise, i.e. if β ∈ [βcrit(w),∞), firms will pay the tax. Furthermore,
f(w, 0) = 0, f(0, β) = 0, limw→∞ f(w, β) = 0 and limβ→∞ f(w, β) = 0.
τ is endogenously determined as the ratio of tax revenues to taxpaying
firms’ gross wages.
Solving the first-order condition of (1) for emissions gives the optimal
emissions level for a firm that pays the tax:
e∗t = β(α + θ − t). (2)
Given firms’ allocation to instruments as proposed by Krysiak and Oberauner
(2010), τ is
τ =
θE t+ t (α− t)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
wf(w, β) dβ dw
, (3)
8As shown by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), heterogeneity with regard to α has no
effect on the results and is therefore assumed to be constant across firms.
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with θE =
∫∞
0
∫∞
βcrit(w)
βθf(w, β) dβ dw and E (θE) = 0.
Substituting Eq. (2) and (3) into Eq. (1) and taking expectations results
in expected savings from emitting of
E (St(e∗t )) =
β
2
(t2+α2)−αβt+wt (α− t)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
wf(w, β) dβ dw
+
β
2
σ2−Ft.
(4)
Analogously, if a firm chooses to participate in permit trading, it maximizes
the savings function9
max
e≥0
Sp(e) = (α + θ)e− e
2
2β
+ p(ψe¯− e)− Fp. (5)
p denotes the price of permits, ψ the allocation rate of permits to historic
emissions e¯, and Fp the fixed costs. The price term in Eq. (5) is positive
when the firm is a seller of permits, and negative in case the firm holds a
buyer position.
The optimal level of emissions of a firm participating in emissions trading
is then
e∗p = β(α + θ − p). (6)
The price of permits is endogenously determined, as it depends on the number
of firms that choose permit trading. Calculating the market-clearing price of
permits gives
p = α− ψe¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
f(w, β) dβ dw∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw
+ θp, (7)
with θp =
∫∞
0
∫∞
βcrit(w)
θβf(w, β) dβ dw/
∫∞
0
∫∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw, reflecting
the price uncertainty due to uncertainty in firms’ savings. Furthermore, we
have E (θp) = 0, E (θθp) = ρσ2 and E
(
θ2p
)
= ρσ2.
9Subscript p indicates permits.
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As shown by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010), for a policy menu design to
be optimal, the expected price of permits has to equal the tax rate. Then,
expected marginal savings among all firms are equalized, and firms’ savings
from emitting are at a maximum. Thus, when choosing an instrument from
the policy menu, a firm anticipates an optimal policy and expects the price
of permits to equal the tax, i.e. E (p) = t.
With a price of permits as in Eq. (7), optimal emissions as in Eq. (6),
and taking into account that E (p) = t, the expected savings from emissions
are
E (Sp(e∗p)) = β2 (t2 + α2)− αβt+ ψe¯t+ β2 (1− ρ)σ2 − Fp. (8)
From Eq. (4) and (8) the intuition of a firm’s instrument choice becomes
obvious. A firm benefits from uncertainty under both instruments. How-
ever, this benefit is larger when the firm chooses the tax due to the better
adjustment possibilities of emissions to shocks.
Given the expected savings under both instruments, the decision criterion
for the choice of instrument of a firm is
∆ =E (Sp(e∗))− E (St(e∗)) =
= (ψe¯t− Fp)−
wt (α− t)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
βf(w, β) dβ dw∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
βcrit(w)
wf(w, β) dβ dw
+
β
2
ρσ2 − Ft
 .
(9)
Hence, a firm chooses to participate in emissions trading whenever the
expected benefits of trading outweigh the expected benefits under the tax.
Otherwise, the firm chooses to pay the tax, i.e. when ∆ is negative. The
benefits of permit trading are characterized by the value of permits allotted to
a firm minus the trade-specific fixed costs. By contrast, the benefits of the tax
comprise the refund of tax receipts (the first term in brackets of Eq. (9)), plus
the flexibility advantage under uncertainty of taxpaying firms, and net of the
fixed costs to be incurred with the tax payment. A firm is indifferent between
the instruments when the expected benefits under emissions trading equal
12
the expected tax-specific benefits (i.e. the firm with technology parameter
βcrit(w)).
5 Data and Variables
To prove the empirical evidence of the theoretical model, firm-level data of
Switzerland’s manufacturing industry were used. Data were obtained from a
survey conducted in fall 2009 in the course of a research project on the effects
of Swiss climate policy on firms for the WWZ Forum, University of Basel
(Oberauner and Krysiak, 2010). The universe for the survey was specified as
manufacturing industries in the German-speaking part of Switzerland with
30 employees or more.10
The survey sample was constructed on the basis of four sources. The
first and main source is a random draft of the Swiss Federal Statistical Of-
fice (FSO) from September 2009, drafted proportional to grouped employees
and industries (FSO survey sample). Second, to increase their share in the
sample, a selection of emissions trading firms was added (published on the
National Emissions Trading Registry). Third, firms in the manufacturing
industry listed at the SIX Swiss Exchange were integrated for the purpose of
increasing the number of firms expected to possess good levels of data avail-
ability. Finally, a selection of ISO-14001 certified firms were added because
these promised a higher chance of climate-related data availability. Except
the firms that were obtained from the FSO, selection problems arose. It was
not possible to ensure conformity in all the criteria specified for the universe.
By fall 2009, 1829 firms were surveyed by means of a written question-
naire; 125 responded to our survey inquiry. Out of the response sample, 72
firms were left that met the requirements for our analysis and could unam-
biguously be assigned to either tax or permit trading (response sample). Due
10Only manufacturing firms were taken into account, as they are more concerned with
climate policy issues than, for example, the service industries (the involved industries are
listed in Table 5 in the Appendix). To avoid any distortions from translation, only firms
in the German-speaking part of Switzerland were considered. Regional differences were
not to be expected. To increase the chance of firm data availability, labor staff was set to
a minimum of 30.
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to missing values in some of the explanatory variables, and depending on the
specification estimated, further observations were dropped by listwise dele-
tion. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the distributions of employees and industry
affiliation for the FSO survey and the response sample. We only consider the
FSO survey sample for comparisons, as it comprises more than 70 percent of
firms surveyed, and as information on labor staff and industry affiliation was
not available for the remaining sources.
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Figure 1: Distributions of firms’ (grouped) employees in the FSO survey and
the response sample (source: sample draft of the Swiss Federal Statistical
Office from September 8, 2009 and survey data)
While the FSO survey sample is positively skewed with respect to the
number of employees, the response sample approaches being a normal distri-
bution. Thus, small firms are underrepresented in our analysis.11 In contrast,
distributions of firms’ industry affiliation are quite similar. Only the shares of
the food, beverages and tobacco industries and the chemical and pharmaceu-
11Larger firms may be better informed and may collect more data on climate-related
issues, thereby facilitating questionnaire completion.
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tical industries are disproportionately high in the response sample, whereas
energy provision, water provision and treatment and the manufacture of wood
products are underrepresented.
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Figure 2: Distributions of firms’ industry affiliation in the FSO survey and
the response sample (source: sample draft of the Swiss Federal Statistical
Office from September 8, 2009 and survey data)
Testing the theoretical model of Section 4, and more precisely in order to
predict instrument choice according to the decision criterion in Eq. (9), data
on the chosen regulatory instrument, the potential allocation of permits to
all firms, firms’ gross wages, as well as measures of firm flexibility in adjust-
ing emissions to shocks and of their exposure to uncertainty were needed.
Questionnaire design specifics and data transformations on these variables
are briefly sketched in the following and are summarized in a list of variables
in Table 1.
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Table 1: List of variables
Variable Label
Instrument Dummy variable indicating instrument choice (1=emissions
trading, 0=tax)
Emissions Emissions intensity: emissions in 2008 divided by sales in 2008
[million Swiss francs]
Wages Wage intensity: gross wages in 2008 [million Swiss francs]
divided by sales in 2008 [million Swiss francs]
Flex Composite variable indicating flexibility of abatement
technology in adjusting emissions to abatement cost shocks
Uncert Composite variable indicating firms’ exposure to uncertainty in
abatement cost
Flex ∗ Uncert Interaction term of Flex and Uncert
Abate_low Dummy variable indicating low overall abatement in 2008 (less
than 5 %) – reference dummy
Abate_mod Dummy variable indicating moderate overall abatement in 2008
(5 – 19 %)
Abate_high Dummy variable indicating high overall abatement in 2008 (20
% or more)
LnSales Natural logarithm of sales in 2008 [million Swiss francs]
First of all, the variable Instrument indicates instrument choice and
serves as the dependent variable in our empirical model. Since two instru-
ments are offered by the Swiss government, namely a tax and emissions
trading, Instrument is a binary variable and takes on one of the two values:
Instrument =
 1 emissions trading with probability p,0 tax with probability 1− p.
The dependent variable is constructed based on three questions formu-
lated to identify the instrument assignments as being mutually exclusive.
Firms were queried on exemption from the tax, on participation in one of
the models provided by the Energy Agency for the Economy (see Footnote
2) and, finally, on participation in permit trading. Firms have to pay the tax
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whenever they purchase fossil fuels. So, they must get exempted from it in
order to avoid being within the tax regime. Only firms that host the Energy
Model are entitled to participate in permit trading. The question on partic-
ipation in permit trading serves to ensure correct instrument assignment.
Second, data on the allocation of permits in 2008 were, by definition, only
available for firms involved in permit trading. The correlation between the
allocation of permits to firms in emissions trading and CO2 emissions in 2008
was, however, almost perfect, so, the latter serves as a proxy for potential
permit allocation in 2008 for all firms.12 In turn, CO2 emissions in 2008
were divided by the sales in 2008 to correct for scale effects. This emissions
intensity measure is denoted by the variable Emissions.
Third, firms were asked for their gross wages in 2008 to measure the
influence of the wage-based tax refund on instrument choice. Again, we
corrected for scale effects by dividing them by the sales in 2008. The wage
intensity variable is denoted by Wages.
Finally, to verify the flexibility-uncertainty advantage of the tax, the com-
posite variables Flex (to measure flexibility) and Uncert (to measure uncer-
tainty) were constructed. Both variables are multiple-indicator measures out
of the four Likert items: fuel prices, input prices, output demand and break-
down of production equipment. A five-point scale was employed to indicate
the flexibility of a firm’s technology to adjust emissions to shocks and its
exposure to fluctuations with regard to each item. The scores of the items
were averaged to form a flexibility and a uncertainty score for each firm. 5
represents the highest level of flexibility/exposure to uncertainty and 1 the
12CO2 emission data were also available for the year 2006, i.e. before climate policy
has been announced by the regulator. The correlation between emissions in 2006 and the
allocation of permits in 2008 amounts to 0.9919. However, some observations would have
been dropped with this proxy due to missing values. Besides, CO2 emissions of firms that
were allocated permits in 2008 are published on the National Emissions Trading Registry,
operated by the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (2010a). Thus, data quality could
have been improved by correcting for errors and missing values when the firm’s identity
was known. For these reasons, we preferred to use 2008 emissions data, i.e. when climate
policy measures were already implemented (the correlation coefficient between 2006 and
2008 emissions data amounts to 0.9816). The correlation between CO2 emissions in 2008
and permit allocation in 2008 for firms participating in emissions trading and observations
used to estimate the empirical model specifications of Section 6 is 0.9891.
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lowest. What matters for testing the theoretical model, is the interaction
term of Flex and Uncert labeled as Flex ∗ Uncert.
To control for further influencing factors, sales in 2008 (LnSales) and
the overall abatement activity were included in the empirical model. The
natural logarithm of sales in 2008 serves to detect potential scale effects
in instrument choice. With regard to abatement, firms were asked on a
seven-point scale to report their overall abatement of CO2 emissions in 2008
compared to a situation with no abatement at all. The scale was reduced to
three categories with a dummy variable constructed for each category: (1)
Abate_low indicating abatement lower than 5 percent (reference category);
(2) Abate_mod indicating abatement between 5 and 19 percent; and (3)
Abate_high indicating abatement of 20 percent and above.
The small size of the sample and the wide range of industry classes (see
Table 5 in the Appendix) made it impossible to reliably control for industry-
specific effects. Moreover, since the data on emissions intensity are signifi-
cantly non-homogeneous within a class of industry, even the use of a dummy
variable on emissions-intensive industries is considered inappropriate. For
example, although the pharmaceutical industry is associated with emissions-
intensive industries, it also covers firms with low intensity. This might be
attributable, for example, to fuel substitution or to a firm’s core business
operating at a low-emission stage in the production chain. Therefore, we
consider firm-level comparisons based on emissions intensity, i.e. by the
variable Emissions, to be more adequate than any comparisons based on
industry affiliation.
In the following section, the estimation results are presented for various
specifications of the empirical model.
6 Empirical Model Specifications and Results
The full sample used for the estimation consists of 30 firms that participate
in emissions trading and 42 that pay the tax. Due to the binary character
of the dependent variable Instrument, a logit model is used for the regres-
sion analysis. Thus, in our empirical model, the conditional probability of
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choosing emissions trading has the form
Pr(Instrumenti = 1|x) =Λ(β0 + β1 ∗ Emissionsi + β2 ∗Wagesi (10)
+ β3 ∗ Flex ∗ Uncerti + β4 ∗ Abate_modi
+ β5 ∗ Abate_highi + β6 ∗ LnSalesi),
with Λ(·) as the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution.
Our theoretical model predicts a positive influence of Emissions on instru-
ment choice, i.e. when the emissions intensity is increased, the probability of
choosing emissions trading is expected to rise. Hence, we expect a positive
value for the estimated coefficient. In contrast, firms benefit from a high tax
refund when wages are high, making the tax more attractive. The coefficient’s
sign for Wages is therefore expected to be negative. Theory also suggests a
negative effect of the flexibility-uncertainty value (Flex ∗ Uncert) on firms’
preference for emissions trading. The remaining control variables included
in the empirical model are the abatement dummies and the log-transform of
sales. Descriptive statistics on the dependent and the explanatory variables
are listed in Table 2 for various model specifications. Because of missing
values, the listwise deletion procedure reduced the sample size conditional
on the explanatory variables involved. The mean of the dependent variable
Instrument indicates the percentage of firms in emissions trading for the
respective specification.
With all the explanatory variables included, the number of observations
employed was reduced to 62, due to missing values. The reduced sample
contains 36 firms in the tax regime, and 26 in the permit trading regime.
The results of our logit estimation for this specification are presented in the
first column of Table 3.
The coefficients of Emissions and Wages exhibit the correct signs and
are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level for
Emissions and at the 5 percent level for Wages. This is not true, however,
for the flexibility-uncertainty term. The z-value does not indicate a reliable
influence on instrument choice.13 This holds further for the control variable
13Alternative measures of Flex and Uncert were used to test the model. Among others,
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LnSales. So, scale effects in firms’ preferences are not to be observed.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics conditional on model specification
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Model 1 and 2
Instrument 62 0.419 0.497 0 1
Emissions 62 32.654 58.614 0.015 287.692
Wages 62 0.238 0.133 0.008 0.730
Flex*Uncert 62 9.034 3.631 1.5 17
Abate_mod 62 0.435 0.500 0 1
Abate_high 62 0.306 0.465 0 1
LnSales 62 4.153 1.666 1.501 9.852
Model 3
Instrument 72 0.417 0.496 0 1
Emissions 72 33.631 56.071 0.015 287.692
Wages 72 0.240 0.127 0.008 0.730
Abate_mod 72 0.417 0.496 0 1
Abate_high 72 0.306 0.464 0 1
Model 4 and 5
Instrument 42 0.619 0.492 0 1
Emissions 42 46.056 67.241 1.073 287.692
Wages 42 0.216 0.120 0.008 0.571
Flex*Uncert 42 9.447 3.557 1.667 17
Abate_mod 42 0.500 0.506 0 1
Abate_high 42 0.333 0.477 0 1
LnSales 42 4.650 1.598 1.589 9.852
Model 6
Instrument 51 0.588 0.497 0 1
Emissions 51 45.682 62.771 1.073 287.692
Wages 51 0.222 0.115 0.008 0.571
Abate_mod 51 0.471 0.504 0 1
Abate_high 51 0.314 0.469 0 1
The results do not provide evidence in support of the theoretical model
dummy variables were constructed from validity questions that directly asked for flexibil-
ity of abatement technology and uncertainty in abatement costs. All alternative measures
had one thing in common with the actual measures used, Flex and Uncert: the coeffi-
cients’ signs and the z-values do not indicate a statistically significant and monotonously
increasing influence of flexibility and uncertainty on the predicted probability of choosing
emissions trading. The effects of these alternative measures exhibit, however, robustness
in the residual variables with regard to sign, significance and magnitude of coefficients.
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with respect to the negative influence of the flexibility-uncertainty term on
choosing emissions trading. Firms’ instrument choice behavior does not con-
firm a flexibility advantage under uncertainty for taxpaying firms. This may
be attributed to the fact that not only the permit price is uncertain but also
the tax rate. If national emission reduction targets could not be achieved in
previous years, the tax rate will be gradually increased. Indeed, in 2010 the
tax rate was increased from 12 Swiss francs in 2008 and 2009 to 36 Swiss
francs (see Footnote 3). So, when choosing an instrument for several periods,
Swiss firms are not only subject to price uncertainty in the permit trading
regime, but also in the tax regime.
Table 3: Logit regression for instrument choice
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Instrument Instrument Instrument
Emissions 0.104∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(3.04) (3.12) (3.39)
Wages -22.70∗∗ -26.09∗∗ -27.01∗∗∗
(-2.08) (-2.53) (-2.74)
Flex*Uncert 0.130 0.132
(0.85) (0.85)
Abate_low reference reference reference
Abate_mod 3.573 3.853∗ 4.510∗∗
(1.55) (1.78) (2.14)
Abate_high 4.039∗ 4.188∗ 5.077∗∗
(1.70) (1.87) (2.29)
LnSales 0.247
(0.73)
Constant -3.615 -2.084 -1.495
(-1.09) (-0.86) (-0.63)
Observations 62 62 72
p-Value (F -Test) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.610 0.604 0.628
Count R2 0.887 0.871 0.875
z statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In turn, in Model 2 and Model 3 we re-estimated a reduced specification
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omitting LnSales in the former, and both, LnSales and Flex∗Uncert, in the
latter, leading to a larger sample size in Model 3.14 In the reduced model we
observe robust results for the emissions and wage intensity compared to the
Model-1 specification. The results reveal a positive influence of the emissions
intensity and a negative influence of the wage intensity on the probability of
choosing emissions trading (both on a 1 percent significance level). In addi-
tion, overall abatement in 2008 indicates a statistically significant influence
on instrument choice at the 5 percent level in the reduced model.
Our empirical model has a high predictive power. Instrument choice is
correctly classified (i.e. predicted choice corresponds to observed choice) in
87.5 percent of the cases (expressed by Count R2).15 Thus, our model covers
the most influential determinants of instrument choice and only requires a
few variables to predict firms’ preference between a tax and permit trading
correctly with a high degree of probability.
As the coefficients of the regression represent logits that do not have
an intuitive interpretation, we illustrate the dependency of the predicted
probabilities on the emissions and on the wage intensity for reference values
of the remaining variables in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
The influence of the emissions intensity on the probability of choosing
emissions trading is depicted in Figure 3 for various levels of wage intensity
(25th percentile, median, mean and 75th percentile), holding the abatement
dummies constant at their respective mean values.16 The figure illustrates
the positive relationship between the emissions intensity, and in turn po-
tential permit allocation, and the probability of choosing emissions trading.
As the ratio of CO2 emissions to sales increases, the probability that a firm
chooses emissions trading increases, or stated differently, the probability of
a firm choosing the tax decreases. Hence, firms at a low level of wage in-
tensity exhibit a higher probability of choosing emissions trading when their
14A Likelihood-Ratio test indicates that the variables LnSales and Flex ∗ Fluc should
be removed from the model.
15Firms were classified as being 1 (i.e. emissions trading) if their predicted probabil-
ity was above 0.5 percent. Classification towards the tax then consistently indicates a
predicted probability equal to or below 0.5 percent.
16The wage intensity for the reduced sample is positively skewed, thus, the median of
the wage intensity lies above its mean.
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emissions intensity increases. By contrast, firms with a high wage intensity
choose emissions trading only when the emissions intensity is relatively high.
Then, the benefit of the tax refund is large, and can only be outweighed
by a relatively high permit allocation in order to be better off under permit
trading.
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Figure 3: The probability of choosing emissions trading conditional on emis-
sions intensity and various levels of wage intensity: 25th percentile, Median,
Mean and 75th percentile (Model 3; Abate_mod and Abate_high at their
respective mean values)
Figure 4 draws the same picture for the probability of choosing emissions
trading conditional on the wage intensity for various levels of the emissions in-
tensity.17 It depicts the negative relation between the probability of choosing
emissions trading and wage intensity. The higher the firms’ wage intensity,
the higher is the probability of choosing the tax. For firms at a low level
of emissions intensity, the probability towards the tax is higher when wages
increase. Thus, firms with a low emissions intensity (and, in turn, a low level
17Emissions intensity is even more positively skewed than the wage intensity.
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of potential permit allocation) are better off with a tax, due to the relatively
high refund of tax payments. Firms with a relatively high emissions intensity,
by contrast, will only be willing to choose the tax when their wage intensity
is comparatively high and the tax refund outweighs the value of the potential
permit allocation.
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Figure 4: The probability of choosing emissions trading conditional on wage
intensity and various levels of emissions intensity: 25th percentile, Median,
Mean and 75th percentile (Model 3; Abate_mod and Abate_high at their
respective mean values)
Figures 3 and 4 reflect not only the empirical evidence of the theory with
regard to emissions and wages presented in Section 4, but also confirm that
firms behave as suggested by the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment
(2007a). They propose that firms should participate in emissions trading
whenever they exhibit high CO2 emissions in conjunction with low wages
and should pay the tax in the reverse situation.
Estimation results in the third column of Table 3 indicate that firms tend
to opt for emissions trading when abatement efforts are relatively high. There
24
is, however, no rationale behind these results. Depending on the instrument
considered, the rational firm sets marginal abatement costs (marginal savings
from emitting) equal to the price or to the tax and solves for optimal abate-
ment (emissions). In expectations, optimal abatement (emissions) is (are)
the same for both instruments. So, from a theoretical point of view, vari-
ances in abatement effort should not be an issue with respect to instrument
choice.
One possible reason for this might be that firms participating in permit
trading have the prospect of being able to bank their permits beyond the
Kyoto period, i.e. beyond 2012 (Swiss Federal Office for the Environment,
2007b).18 Legislation on Swiss climate policy might be more restrictive in
future periods, i.e. the tax might be increased, and the cap for permits might
be reduced. Moreover, the free permit allocation mode might be partly sub-
stituted by auction (Swiss Federal Council, 2009). In addition, the Swiss
confederation intends to link up the national emissions trading system with
the emissions trading system run by the European Union (EU ETS) no later
than 2013 (Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2009). A more restric-
tive policy in the European Union after the Kyoto period may force Swiss
policy design to get tougher in order to be accepted for linkage by the Eu-
ropean Commission. One might argue that, both aspects, a more stringent
national policy and a trading scheme linkage, might induce permit trading
firms to increase abatement efforts to build up a bank of permits for future
policy periods. Inter-period banking with a 1-to-1 permit ratio may, however,
be an obstacle for linking up with the EU ETS too.
Table 3 presents the results of the logit estimation for all firms in the
sample, no matter how much CO2 they emit and independent of firm size. For
small- and medium-sized firms, the Swiss confederation established quantity
targets that correspond to a mixture of a CAC instrument and emissions
trading (see Footnote 2). Firms with energy costs lower than 200,000 Swiss
francs are either regulated by a plan of actions or else by a benchmark (for
18Banking to periods beyond 2012 is not established by law so far. However, the Swiss
Federal Office for the Environment (2007b) specifies the prospect of banking in its commen-
tary on the CO2 ordinance (CO2-Verordnung). Additionally, the Swiss Federal Council
(2009) documents the possibility of banking in its proposal to the revision of the CO2 Act.
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homogeneous groups of firms). These firms do not receive permits allocated
free of charge and are not allowed to sell excess emissions. But they are
permitted to cover their emissions with permits purchased on the permit
market in case they should fail to reach their targets. Firms that exhibit
energy costs of at least 200,000 Swiss francs are unrestrictedly permitted
to participate in emissions trading (Energy Agency for the Economy, n.d.).
Therefore, freedom of instrument choice between the tax and permit trading
is restricted in our sample of Model-3 specification.
Table 4: Logit regression for instrument choice with freedom of choice
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Instrument Instrument Instrument
Emissions 0.0798∗∗ 0.0796∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗
(2.48) (2.47) (2.79)
Wages -20.11∗ -21.20∗∗ -21.43∗∗
(-1.95) (-2.18) (-2.37)
Flex*Uncert 0.136 0.135
(0.84) (0.82)
Abate_low reference reference reference
Abate_mod 2.920 2.980 3.758∗∗
(1.44) (1.49) (2.03)
Abate_high 3.831∗ 3.914∗ 4.907∗∗
(1.77) (1.84) (2.39)
LnSales 0.103
(0.28)
Constant -2.129 -1.463 -1.107
(-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.51)
Observations 42 42 51
p-Value (F -Test) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.502 0.500 0.557
Count R2 0.857 0.857 0.863
z statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Taking into account that only firms with energy costs beyond 200,000
Swiss francs exhibit unrestricted freedom of instrument choice, we gain the
logit estimation results presented in Table 4.
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Specifications of Model 4, 5 and 6 are the freedom-of-choice analogue of
Model 1, 2 and 3. The signs of the coefficients are the same for both classes
of specifications, i.e. with and without restrictions in freedom of choice. But
there are small differences in the statistical significance and in the magnitude
of the coefficients. Again, Flex∗Fluc and LnSales are omitted from the full
model (Model 4) for the same reasons as above, which results in the Model-6
specification. Goodness of fit in Model 6, expressed by Count R2, is only
less than one percentage point lower in the freedom-of-choice specification,
whereas the Pseudo R2 increases.
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Figure 5: The probability of choosing emissions trading conditional on emis-
sions intensity with restricted and unrestricted freedom of choice (Model 3
and 6; Wages, Abate_mod and Abate_high at their respective mean values)
The effect of freedom of choice on predicted probability is displayed in
Figures 5 and 6, respectively. When firms are free to choose between the in-
struments, the probability of choosing emissions trading is higher for all lev-
els of emissions intensity (Figure 5). Consequently, if we plot the probability
curve as being dependent on wage intensity (Figure 6), the freedom-of-choice
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cumulative distribution function is always above the one with restrictions.
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Figure 6: The probability of choosing emissions trading conditional on wage
intensity with restricted and unrestricted freedom of choice (Model 3 and 6;
Emissions, Abate_mod and Abate_high at their respective mean values)
Figures 5 and 6 make the natural result of abolishing restrictions on
instrument choice obvious. The preference in favor of permit trading is en-
hanced when firms are free to choose. One might argue that allocating free
permits even to small- and medium-sized firms and allowing them to sell
their excess emissions would enhance the liquidity of the Swiss permit trading
scheme, which has suffered from low liquidity and low trade volume in Swiss
Units since its beginnings in 2008 (Swiss Federal Office for the Environment,
2008). Moreover, the cost effectiveness of climate mitigation measures would
be increased by substituting a CAC-style instrument with pure permit trad-
ing. However, this result may not be generally valid, as only large emitters
are considered in our freedom-of-choice sample. If unrestricted instrument
choice is permitted even to small- and medium-sized firms, the results may
change. Fixed costs associated with participating in emissions trading are
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substantial compared to the tax (see Footnote 5), shrinking the benefits of
free permit allocation.
7 Conclusions
In our paper, we empirically investigate firms’ preferences in the choice be-
tween a tax and permit trading when the regulatory authority delegates in-
strument choice to firms. Such a self-selection mechanism is implemented on
firms’ carbon dioxide emissions in Switzerland. With Swiss firm-level data,
we were thus able to contribute to the prices vs. quantities literature with
an empirical study on instrument choice from the perspective of firms.
The theoretical framework for our analysis on instrument self-selection is
provided by Krysiak and Oberauner (2010). When there is uncertainty with
regard to firms’ abatement costs and, in addition, asymmetric information
between the regulatory authority and the firms, they show that a “Policy à
la Carte” dominates a single tax or permit trading regime in expected wel-
fare terms. In order to ensure a socially optimal assignment of firms to the
instruments, they allow for partly auctioned permits and/or a tax exemption
modeled as a lump sum. We adopt this theoretical approach of firms’ instru-
ment choice, remodel it for specific Swiss climate policy characteristics (pure
grandfathering of permits, wage-based tax refund for taxpaying firms), and
apply it to Swiss manufacturing firm data. Theory suggests that firms choose
emissions trading whenever the expected benefits of trading (the value of
potential permit allocation minus trade-specific fixed costs) outweigh the ex-
pected benefits of paying the tax (the tax refund, plus a flexibility-uncertainty
advantage of the tax, and minus tax-specific fixed costs).
Based on the theoretical model, an empirical model of firms’ instrument
choice was constructed using the tax and participation in emissions trading to
characterize the binary dependent variable. Results from a logit estimation
do not provide evidence in support of the theoretical model with respect to
the flexibility-uncertainty term. Emissions intensity (a proxy for the potential
permit allocation of all firms due to missing values for firms that pay the tax)
and wages intensity (to indicate the wage-based tax refund) are, however,
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crucial in the choice of instrument that firms make. If wages are low (i.e.
a firm’s tax refund is low), the probability of choosing emissions trading is
relatively high, as the benefits under the tax are more easily compensated
with the benefits under emissions trading (i.e. the value of permit allocation).
In case of high-wage firms, the opposite is true. If the emissions, and thus
permit allocation, of a firm are at a low level, the probability of choosing
the tax is higher than for a high-emission firm, due to a more dominant tax
refund incentive.
In addition to emissions and wages, estimation results reveal significance
with regard to abatement activity that is theoretically unfounded. As a mat-
ter of fact, we observe high-abatement firms to exhibit a higher probability
of choosing emissions trading. This result may be attributed to the banking
of permits beyond the Kyoto period. Moreover, the empirical analysis does
not detect scale effects with regard to firms’ preferences.
Estimation results exhibit a convincing model fit, although only a few
explanatory variables were employed. Thus, with only limited information
on firms, we are able to predict a firm’s preference for one of the instruments
correctly with a high degree of probability.
Firms exhibiting low energy costs are restricted in their choice of instru-
ment. They are neither allocated free permits nor are they allowed to sell
excess emissions to their quantity target. They are, however, permitted to
purchase permits if they are not able to achieve their targets. Restricting
our sample to only those firms that are completely free to choose between
the tax and permit trading (i.e. firms above a certain energy cost threshold)
raises the probability of choosing emissions trading. This may indicate that
allocating permits to all firms choosing a quantity instrument and permit-
ting them unrestricted trade in their emission rights might increase not only
the cost effectiveness of climate policy design in Switzerland, but it might
also enhance liquidity, trade volume and the transparency of the price sig-
nal in the permit market. This might only be true when higher fixed costs
compared to the tax render permit trading profitable even for small- and
medium-sized firms.
30
References
Baumol, W. J. and W. E. Oates, 1988, The Theory of Environmental Policy,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd ed.
Delmas, M. and A. Marcus, 2004, Firms’ Choice of Regulatory Instruments
to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach, Business and Politics,
6 (3).
Energy Agency for the Economy, n.d., Effizienz durch Energie-Modell, Ein
Angebot der Energie-Agentur der Wirtschaft für mittlere und grosse Un-
ternehmen, Available from: http://www.enaw.ch/content.cfm?upid=
BEB7CD5C-663F-4B71-94FCE750EF227DB3&type=pdf&filetype=pdf (Ac-
cess date: June 18, 2010).
Hepburn, C., 2006, Regulation by prices, quantities, or both: A review of
instrument choice, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22 (2), pp. 226–247.
Hoel, M. and L. Karp, 2002, Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant, Re-
source and Energy Economics, 24, pp. 367–384.
Krysiak, F. C. and I. M. Oberauner, 2010, Environmental Policy à la Carte:
Letting Firms Choose their Regulation, Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management, 60, pp. 221–232.
Mandell, S., 2008, Optimal Mix of Emissions Taxes and Cap-and-Trade,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Managment.
Newell, R. G. and W. A. Pizer, 2003, Regulating stock externalities under
uncertainty, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 45,
pp. 416–432.
Oberauner, I. M. and F. C. Krysiak, 2010, Empirische Analyse der
Wirkung der Schweizer Klimapolitik aus Unternehmensperspektive,
WWZ research report 08/10 (B-111), Download: http://wwz.unibas.
ch/fileadmin/wwz/redaktion/Forum/Forschungsberichte/2010/
ForschungsberichtB-111.pdf (Access date: September 17, 2010).
31
Pizer, W. A., 2002, Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global
climate change, Journal of Public Economics, 85, pp. 409–434.
Roberts, M. J. and M. Spence, 1976, Eﬄuent Charges and Licences under
Uncertainty, Journal of Public Economics, 5, pp. 193–208.
Rohling, M. and M. Ohndorf, 2010, Prices vs. Quantities with Fiscal Cush-
ioning, IED Working Paper 11.
Swiss Federal Assembly, 1999, Bundesgesetz über die Reduktion der CO2-
Emissionen (CO2-Gesetz), Available from: http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/
sr/c641_71.html (Access date: June 28, 2010).
Swiss Federal Council, 2009, Botschaft über die Schweizer Klimapolitik nach
2012, Revision des CO2-Gesetzes und eidgenössische Volksinitiative 
Für ein gesundes Klima, Available from: http://www.news.admin.ch/
NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/18633.pdf (Access date: June
28, 2010).
Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2007a, Die CO2-Abgabe: Häu-
fige Fragen, Available from: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/co2-abgabe/
05244/index.html?lang=de (Access date: June 23, 2010).
Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2007b, Erläuterungen
zur Verordnung über die CO2-Abgabe (CO2-Verordnung), Avail-
able from: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/co2-abgabe/05311/index.
html?lang=de (Access date: June 17, 2010).
Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2008, Übersicht der im na-
tionalen Register getätigten Transaktionen pro Jahr, 2008, Available from:
https://www.national-registry.ch/Edition.aspx?menu=yes (Access
date: June 29, 2010).
Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2009, Bundesrat erteilt Verhand-
lungsmandat für Verknüpfung mit EU-Emissionshandel, Available from:
http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformation/
32
00962/index.html?lang=de&msg-id=30717 (Access date: June 29,
2010).
Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2010a, Effektive Emissionen aller
Betreiber 2008, Available from: https://www.national-registry.ch/
(Access date: February 19, 2010).
Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2010b, Emissions Trading Registry,
Available from: https://www.national-registry.ch/ListePnaq.aspx?
Period=01&menu=yes&LANGUE=en (Access date: June 08, 2010).
Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 2010c, Rückverteilung der
CO2-Abgabe, Available from: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/co2-abgabe/
05179/05316/index.html?lang=de (Access date: May 05, 2010).
Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2008, NOGA 2008 General Classi-
fication of Economic Activities, Structure, Neuchâtel, Available
from: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/news/
publikationen.Document.111331.pdf (Access date: June 29, 2010).
Weitzman, M. L., 1974, Prices vs. Quantities, The Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 41 (4), pp. 477–491.
Williams III, R. C., 2002, Prices vs. Quantities vs. Tradable Quantities,
NBER Working Paper 9283.
33
Appendix
Table 5: NOGA 2008 General Classification of Economic Activities (Swiss
Federal Statistical Office, 2008)
Code Industry
10 Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical
preparations
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
36 Water collection, treatment and supply
37 Sewerage
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services
34
